Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and the First Amendment by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 8 
1983 
Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and the 
First Amendment 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and the First Amendment, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (1983). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol81/iss8/6 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Secondary Consumer Picketing, Statutory Interpretation and 
the First Amendment 
Section 8(b)(4), the secondary boycott1 provision of the National 
Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA),2 has been described 
as "one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a fed-
eral labor statute."3 Since its inception, "Section 8(b)(4) ... has 
caused the [National Labor Relations] Board and the courts consid-
erable consternation in drawing the line between primary and secon-
dary activity and, moreover, in specifying the types of secondary 
activity proscribed by the section."4 
One persistent and vexing question for the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (Board) and the courts has been the extent to which sub-
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits picketing of secondary businesses as a 
means of persuading consumers to boycott the products of a primary 
employer.5 This provision does not literally prohibit picketing. 
Rather, it declares that a union that "threaten[s], coerce[s], or re-
1. Unions resort to secondary boycotts to persuade customers patronizing a secondary 
business not to buy goods produced by a primary employer with whom the union has a labor 
dispute. A "secondary business" is one that deals in the primary employer's goods. This Note 
deals with peaceful picketing at customer entrances of secondary businesses, through which a 
union seeks public support and requests a boycott of the primary employer's products. The 
Note uses the terms "consumer picketing" and "secondary consumer picketing" to describe 
this activity. See generally A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 42-43 (2d ed. rev. 
1977). 
2. The section reads in pertinent part: 
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents -
(4) ... (ii} to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person ... where •.. an object thereof 
is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or 
otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer or to 
cease doing business with any other person, . . . : Provided, That nothing contained in 
this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful . . . any primary strike or primary 
picketing; 
... Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained 
in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the 
purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor 
organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the 
labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer . . . . 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA}, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 
§ 704, 73 Stat. 519, 542-43 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976)). 
3. Aaron, 17ze .Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REv. 
1086, 1113 (1960). 
4. Zimmerman, 17ze Changing Arsenal of Economic Weapons: Consequences for Section 
8(b)(4), the Board and the Courts, 34 PROC. N.Y.U. CoNF. ON LAB. 79, 80 (1982). 
5. See, e.g., Hoffman ex rel NLRB v. Cement Masons Local 337,468 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical 
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strain[s]" any person, with the object of compelling that person to 
stop dealing with another, commits an unfair labor practice. A pro-
viso then excepts "publicity, other than picketing" from the section's 
coverage.6 
The Supreme Court interpreted this language in NLRB v. Fruit & 
Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits) .1 Union pickets had 
asked customers of a supermarket not to purchase nonunion apples 
on sale there. The Court avoided the first amendment questions that 
strict application of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would have raised8 by re-
jecting the "negative inference"9 that exclusion of picketing from the 
proviso necessarily meant its inclusion as an unfair labor practice. 10 
The Court held that consumer picketing limited to the struck prod-
uct is "poles apart" from picketing that seeks to shut off all trade 
with a secondary, 11 and therefore does not "threaten, coerce, or re-
strain" within the meaning of section 8(b )( 4)(ii)(B).12 
Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as 
moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). 
6. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
(1976); see note 2 supra. 
7. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). 
8. 377 U.S. at 63 ("[Al broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide with the guaran• 
tees of the First Amendment."). The Court thus did not resolve the constitutionality of con-
gressional restrictions on consumer picketing. However, Justice Powell later concluded 
otherwise when he observed that ''the Court left no doubt that Congress may prohibit secon-
dary picketing calculated 'to persuade the customers of the secondary employer to cease trad-
ing with him in order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary 
employer.' 377 U.S., at 63." NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 
447 U.S. 607,616 (1980). But see St. Antoine,Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persist• 
ing Problem of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 883, 900 (1982) ("In fact, in the passage 
quoted from Tree Fruits, the Court was merely stating what it thought Congress had and had 
not done. The opinion was notably circumspect about prejudging the constitutionally allowa-
ble limits of restraints on peaceful consumer picketing."). 
9. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 897. 
IO. 377 U.S. at 69 ("(I]t does not follow from the fact that some coercive conduct was 
protected by the proviso, that the exception 'other than picketing' indicates that Congress had 
determined that all consumer picketing was coercive."). 
11. 377 U.S. at 70. 
12. 377 U.S. at 72-73. Justice Brennan explained that while secondary consumer picketing 
might induce a secondary business to stop buying from the primary employer, that reaction 
would follow from the falling demand for the struck product. He contrasted this situation with 
one in which the pickets urge consumers not to patronize the secondary at all. In that case, 
secondary employers might stop dealing with the primary employer not only because of re-
duced demand for the struck product, but also to "prevent the loss of sales of other products." 
377 U.S. at 72 n.20. While the language of the statute arguably prohibits secondary picketing 
in either instance, Justice Brennan concluded that a literal reading of the statute would contra-
vene congressional intent. 377 U.S. at 72 (" '[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute 
and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its 
makers.'") (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1891)). Thus, 
Tree Fruits is a statutory interpretation case that examines the threshold level of coercion 
needed to make peaceful secondary picketing an unfair labor practice. See Mack & Lieber• 
witz, Secondary Consumer Picketing: The First Amendment Questions Remain, 32 MERCER L. 
REV. 815, 822-23 (1981). 
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The Tree Fruits decision did not end uncertainty in the area, be-
cause the struck product in that case constituted only a small 13 and 
separable14 portion of the secondary's retail sales. InNLRB v. Retail 
Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 15 however, the struck 
product accounted for ninety percent of the picketed secondary em-
ployer's business. Although the Court had rejected an economic loss 
test of coercion in Tree Fruits, 16 it held in Safeco that such picketing 
"reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or 
substantial loss [and] simply does not square with the language or 
the purpose of§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."17 Although a majority of the Court 
agreed that such a prohibition did not conflict with the first amend-
ment, the justices were unable to agree on the constitutional basis 
that justified regulation of picketing. 
This Note examines both the statutory and constitutional impli-
cations of Safeco and Tree Fruits. It suggests that the confusion sur-
rounding existing Board and court interpretations of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) stems from the Supreme Court's failure to assess realis-
tically the impact that consumer picketing has on secondary busi-
nesses, as well as the Court's refusal to examine the objectives of 
unions that resort to secondary picketing. 18 
13. Tree Fruits did not foreclose the question whether§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited consumer 
picketing of a secondary business that dealt substantially or exclusively in the primary's goods. 
See 377 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The single-product retailer situation first arose in 
Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 649 (1974), enforcement 
denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). Dow Chemical 
involved picketing of gas stations by striking refinery workers. The Board reasoned that 
§ S(b)(4) prohibited consumer picketing that would discourage customers from buying any 
tires and other automotive accessories from the stations. The Court of Appeals, in denying the 
Board's application for enforcement, rejected the notion that the permissibility of picketing 
turned on its economic impact and noted that "[w)hile the small part the struck product had in 
the whole of the Safeway business was not overlooked by the Court [in Tree Fruits), it was not 
the basis for the decision." 524 F.2d at 858. 
14. Tree Fruits did not deal with situations in which the struck product or service was 
inseparable from the rest of the secondary's business. The Board and the courts have fash-
ioned a "merged products" doctrine prohibiting picketing in such cases. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Twin City Dist. Council, 422 F.2d 309 (8th Cir. 1970) (kitchen cabinets in new homes); Ameri-
can Bread Co. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1969) (bread in restaurant); Honolulu Typo-
graphical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (advertising); NLRB v. 
Building Serv. Employees Union Local 105,367 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1966) (janitorial service); 
Laundry Workers lnt'l Union, Local No. 259, 164 N.L.R.B. 426 (1967) (laundry service); see 
text at notes 145-48 infra. 
15. 447 U.S. 607 (1980). 
16. 377 U.S. at 72 (''We disagree therefore with the Court of Appeals that the test of 'to 
threaten, coerce, or restrain' for the purposes of this case is whether [the secondary employer] 
suffered or was likely to suffer economic loss."). 
17. 447 U.S. at 614-15; see Mack & Lieberwitz, supra note 12, at 825. 
18. Cf. Affeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4): An Integrated Approach 
to Labor Law, 54 GEO. L.J. 55, 56-57 (1965) ("In today's complex industrial order based upon 
a myriad of relationships, ... [w)e require a decision-making process with triangular vision . 
. . . Today for the most part the study oflabor law is a study in fragmentation .... The legal 
process by emphasizing isolated doctrines and isolated facts . . . is detached from the realities 
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As a matter of statutory interpretation, one Board member has 
observed that the Court's failure to formulate a principled basis for 
its decisions in this area has produced a "convoluted statute that has 
been muddied and distorted by judicial interpretation."19 Part I ex-
plores this question by examining the legislative history of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and the Court's treatment of congressional intent in 
Tree Fruits and Safeco. It concludes that Congress did not sepa-
rately consider secondary consumer picketing in framing the section, 
and that the overall congressional objective of balancing the interests 
of unions and secondary businesses does not support the Safeco 
holding that section 8(b )( 4)(ii)(B) automatically prohibits dominant-
product secondary picketing.20 
As a matter of constitutional law, one commentator has written 
that Safeco "comes close to being an unreasoned decision . . . . It is 
constitutional law by fiat."21 Scholars have repeatedly argued, on 
the basis of both logic and precedent, that restrictions on peaceful 
consumer picketing are constitutionally dubious.22 Part II of this 
of the social process. . . . Labor law today has no shape and the Supreme Court has no 
theory."); see notes 43-53 infra and accompanying text. 
19. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 94. 
20. Sefeco did not deal with single-product consumer picketing, but instead decided that 
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibited by its own language all secondary picketing directed against a pri-
mary product that dominated a secondary business, in disregard of whether the picketing had 
any actual economic impact. The Court emphasized, however, that 
the picketing in Tree Fruits and the picketing in this case are relatively extreme examples 
of the spectrum of conduct that the Board and the courts will encounter in complaints 
charging violations of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). If secondary picketing were directed against a 
product representing a major portion of a neutral's business, but sign!ftcantly less than that 
represented by a single dominant product, neither Tree Fruits nor today's decision would 
necessarily control. The critical question would be whether, by encouraging customers to 
reject the struck product, the secondary appeal is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral 
party with ruin or substantial loss. Resolution of the question in each case will be en-
trusted to the Board's expertise. 
447 U.S. at 615 n.11 (emphasis added). 
Essentially, this Note urges that the Board and the courts determine whether the secondary 
picketing in question actually threatens "the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss" re-
gardless of whether the struck product is a dominant or merely a major component of the 
secondary's sales. This approach will accommodate congressional intent and the constitu-
tional requirement that statutes implicating freedom of speech be narrowly drawn and ad-
vance a substantial government interest. 
This Note adopts the Court's nomenclature and will refer to secondary picketing of a prod-
uct that comprises a dominant part of the secondary's business as "dominant-product secon-
dary picketing." This term encompasses fact situations similar to the one appearing in Sefeco, 
as well as to single-product secondary picketing. 
21. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 903. 
22. See generally A. Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 46-47 (1981); T. EMERSON, THE SYS-
TEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 433-49 (1970); Affeldt, supra note 18; Cox, Strikes, Picketing 
and the Constitution, 4 V AND. L. REv. 574 (1951 ); Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A JJlssenl, 
56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Etelson, Picketing and Freedom of Speech: Comes /he Evolution, 
10 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. l (1976); Jaffe, In JJefense of the Supreme Court's Picketing 
Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1037 (1943); Jones, Picketing and Coercion, A Jurisprudence of 
Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Jones, Epithets]; Jones, The Righi to 
Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 995 (1954) [hereinafter cited as 
August 1983] Note - Secondary Consumer Picketing 1821 
Note considers the constitutional theories that the Court relies on to 
justify its conclusion that section 8(b)(4)(ii){B) prohibits picketing of 
a dominant-product secondary, and attempts to reconcile the Court's 
holding that Congress may, in appropriate circumstances, flatly pro-
hibit such activity.23 It concludes that the rationales underlying the 
Court's holding in Safeco are constitutionally unsound because they 
fail to consider the purposes and impact of consumer picketing. 
In other instances in which the Court has reviewed selective re-
strictions on expression protected by the first amendment, it has re-
quired persuasive objective data showing that the restrictions were 
narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest.24 As 
a result, Part III concludes that statutory and constitutional consider-
ations demand that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) be construed to prohibit 
peaceful consumer picketing only on a showing that such picketing 
violates established time, place, and manner restrictions, or that it 
will cause actual and substantial injury to the secondary business. 
I. "THREATEN, COERCE, OR RESTRAIN" - STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION IN TREE FRUITS AND SAFECO 
The view that picketing is inherently coercive is deeply engrained 
Jones, Twilight Zone]; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. 
CT. REv. l; Mack & Lieberwitz,supra note 12; Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: 
Is There a Sofe Way to Picket Under the First Amendment?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Note, Invisible Hand); Note, First Amendment Analysis of Peaceful Picket-
ing, 28 ME. L. REV. 203 (1976). 
23. International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc., 456 U.S. 212,226 (1982) ("We 
have consistently rejected the clainI that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of 
8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amendment." (citing Safeco)). See NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982) (''This Court has recognized the strong 
governmental interest in certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation 
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association. . . . Secondary boycotts 
and picketing by labor unions may be prohibited ..•. " (citing Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence in Safeco)). 
Three more articles arguing that consumer picketing is indistinguishable from other forms 
of constitutionally protected speech have appeared since the Court reiterated its Sofeco hold-
ing in Claiborne Hardware. See St. Antoine, supra note 8; Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and 
the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1469 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Peaceful Pick-
eting]; Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the .Doctrine of 
Free Speech, 91 YALE L.J. 938 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Picketing and Commercial 
Speech]. Although the logic of this position is persuasive, this Note begins instead with the 
premise that the Court is firm in its conviction that the Constitution permits legitimate legisla-
tive regulation of secondary consumer picketing. It then argues that the Court's conviction 
should be applied on principled grounds informed by the realities of secondary consumer 
picketing. 
24. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 
(1980) (evidence of electrical rate inequities was not adequate to justify an energy conservation 
regulation prohibiting utility company advertising); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (insufficient evidence that prohibition of "For Sale" signs on real 
estate was needed to prevent "white flight" from integrated neighborhood). 
1822 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1817 
in the history of the labor movement.25 However, primary picketing 
as a means of pressuring the primary employer in a labor dispute is 
now protected by statute,26 and is acknowledged, albeit with reserva-
tions, as a form of constitutionally protected speech.27 Nevertheless, 
judicial hostility toward picketing of secondary employers in labor 
disputes persists. 28 In Tree Fruits and Safeco, the Supreme Court 
examined the legislative history of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to determine 
whether Congress shared this opposition to peaceful consumer 
picketing. 
A. Congressional Intent and Legislative History 
In amending section 8(b )( 4), Congress did not originally intend 
to prohibit consumer picketing.29 During the course of debate, some 
25. See Jones, Epithets, supra note 22, at 1023-27; Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 22, 
at 1490-91. 
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976) provides in pertinent part "[t]hat nothing contained 
in this clause . . . shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any 
primary strike or primary picketing." 
21. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 
391 U.S. 308,314 (1968) ("[N]o case decided by this Court can be found to support the propo-
sition that the nonspeech aspects of peaceful picketing are so great as to render the provisions 
of the First Amendment inapplicable to it altogether.") (dicta); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88 (1940); notes 59-65 infra and accompanying text. 
28. See Affeldt,supra note 18, at 130-31 (''The Board is a two-headed monster. The Gen-
eral Counsel finds illegal group objectives from facts which the Board would not, yet the Gen-
eral Counsel has the sole power to issue complaints. . . . The power to issue complaints and 
temporary injunctions at the initial stage of picketing is the power to resolve the entire 
case. . . . There is strong evidence today that many trial examiners and regional directors 
... are obtaining injunctions and deciding cases in defiance of established Board policy. Is it 
any wonder that the law in this area is in a state of utter confusion?"); Fleming, Title VII: The 
Taft-Hartley Amendments, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 666,692 (1960) ("It may, of course, be true that 
picketing the retailer will put him out of business. Throughout our history such a result has 
generally impressed the courts as unfair and wrong."); Waldman, Problems of the Boycott-A 
Labor Viewpoint, 14 PROC. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 47, 66 (1961) (''This type of judicial hostil-
ity to boycotts goes back more than 50 years. In effect it represents an attitude that labor, in its 
dispute with industry, should be denied the use of any weapons beyond those available in the 
simple primary strike or primary picket line."). 
29. Congressman Griffin did not mention secondary product picketing in discussing the 
loopholes that the Landrum-Griffin Amendments were designed to correct. 105 CoNG. REc. 
15531-32 (1959), reprinted in 2 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1568 (1959) [hereinafter cited as LEO. HIST.]. 
Consumer picketing was not illegal under the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976), and 
Congressman Griffin emphasized that "it is important to keep in mind that our substitute bill 
would not change - it would only reinforce what was the intent of Congress at the time it 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act." 105 CONG. REc. at 15531, 2 LEO. HIST. at 1568. The idea that 
the provision should also ban consumer picketing seems to have been added later, suggested in 
part by a reference to secondary picketing in a television address by President Eisenhower. 
See 105 CONG. REc. at 19954, 2 LEG. HIST. at 1842-43 (television address of President Eisen-
hower); Cox, The Landrum-Gr{flin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. 
L. REv. 257, 274 (1959) (''There is some reason to think that originally the Republicans and 
Southern Democrats among the House conferees failed to realize that the words were broad 
enough to reach consumer boycotts and would have agreed to eliminate the prohibition, but 
President Eisenhower's radio and television appearance placed them in a dile=a."); St. An-
toine, supra note 8, at 896 ("Initially it appears that this new language was intended to cover 
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legislators who were hostile to secondary activity of any kind did 
propose amendments designed to restrict union secondary activity.30 
However, the legislative history suggests that few legislators consid-
ered whether section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would apply where peaceful con-
sumer picketing was confined to a struck primary product. 31 
Certainly the issue was never taken up by Congress as a whole. 
In Tree Fruits, the Supreme Court held that this legislative his-
tory failed to "reflect with the requisite clarity a congressional plan 
to proscribe all peaceful consumer picketing at secondary sites."32 
The majority distinguished between picketing that sought to shut off 
all trade with a secondary employer and that confined solely to the 
struck product, holding that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) permitted picket-
ing of the latter type.33 Although the Court conceded that this dis-
tinction was not "expressly alluded to in the debates,"34 it concluded 
only physical coercion or economic threats by a union directly against a secondary employer, 
which previously would not have been reached because no work refusals by employees were 
involved. As a result of some rather bizarre backstage legislative maneuvers, however, it de-
veloped as part of the statutory history that the phrase 'threaten, coerce, or restrain' would 
apply to at least some types of consumer boycotts." (footnotes omitted)). 
30. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 6666-71 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., mpra note 29, at 
1193-98 (remarks of Senator McClellan and others on amendment to broaden proscription 
against secondary boycotts, which was defeated). 
31. See Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing - Following the Struck Product, 52 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 189, 198 (1966) (Congress made "no serious attempts" to distinguish between picketing 
designed to dissuade the public from buying the goods of a primary employer and picketing 
that requested the public not to deal with a secondary employer at all.). 
32. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964). 
33. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7; see note 12 mpra and accompanying text. 
14. 377 U.S. at 64. In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that neither the plain language 
nor the legislative history of§ 8(b)(4) supported the Court's distinction between limited and 
general secondary picketing. 377 U.S. at 82-92 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In particular, his re-
view of the statutory history suggests that the legislators who discussed the Landrum-Griffin 
bill assumed that it prohibited all secondary picketing. 377 U.S. at 84-92. Justice Harlan's 
arguments have proved persuasive to many of the commentators who have since written on the 
subject. See, e.g., Zimmerman, mpra note 4, at 82; Note, Peaceful Picketing, mpra note 23, at 
1473 n.31; Comment, Consumer Picketing and the Single-Product Secondary Employer, 47 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 112, 120-24 (1979); Comment, Consumer Picketing of Economically Interdependent 
Parties: Retail Store Employees Local 1001 v. NLRB (Safeco Title Insurance Co.), 32 STAN. 
L. REV. 631, 635-36 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Interdependent Parties]. 
However, some of the passages that Justice Harlan relied on in his discussion of the legisla-
tive history are less convincing when taken in context. For example, he indicates that Senator 
Humphrey, who opposed the provision, "feared" that the phrase "restrain and coerce" was 
targeted at consumer picketing. 377 U.S. at 85 (quoting 105 CONG. REc. 6232 (1959), reprinted 
in 2 LEG. HIST., mpra note 29, at 1037). Several paragraphs earlier, however, Senator 
Humphrey had indicated that the effect of the amendment was not clear: "[I]fthe amendment 
shall be adopted, it will be necessary to go through a whole series of court actions again, and 
no one in the labor-management picture will know for many years where he stands." 105 
CONG. REc. at 6232, 2 LEG. HIST. at 1037. Justice Harlan also refers to Senator Kennedy's 
prepared comparison of the House and Senate bills. He deduces that because the House pro-
posal would have precluded secondary picketing in certain situations, section 8(b)(4) must be 
read to have a similar objective. However, the report cited by Justice Harlan goes on to assert 
that prohibition of appeals to customers "is a basic infringement upon freedom of expression." 
105 CONG. REc. at 16591, 2 LEG. HlsT. at 1708. This statement belies the notion that Congress 
intended section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prohibit all secondary picketing. 
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"that the consumer picketing carried on in this case is not attended 
by the abuses at which the statute was directed."35 
Safeco adds another element to the Tree Fruits distinction: the 
secondary's dependence on the primary employer's product. Al-
though the Court relied on legislative history to develop this addi-
tional factor, the only support for its conclusion derives from a 
remark made in defense of an amendment subsequently defeated by 
the Senate. 36 Thus, the Safeco test further attenuates the link be-
tween the Court's statutory interpretation and the legislative history. 
Absent reliable indicators of congressional intent, the Court 
should focus on the policy goals that section 8(b )( 4) advances. 37 The 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress sought to regulate 
secondary activity38 with the "dual . . . objectives of preserving the 
right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on off ending 
employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoff ending 
employers and others from pressures in controversies not their 
own."39 Admittedly, some picketing is dangerous to neutrals be-
cause it is inherently coercive.40 But in Safeco the Court never as-
sessed whether the consumer picketing in question actually 
threatened, coerced, or restrained the secondary business.41 Instead, 
based solely on the fact that the struck product dominated the secon-
35. 377 U.S. at 64. 
36. 447 U.S. 607, 624 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The only fragment of legislative his-
tory the Court musters in support of its holding forbidding picketing of single product secon• 
dary firms is Senator McClellan's expression of concern that some secondary firms may have 
developed their business entirely on the basis of 'a particular brand of product.' . . . But that 
remark was offered in support of a proposed amendment restricting secondary boycotts that 
was rejected by the Senate .... Section 8(b)(4) as finally enacted was narrower than Senator 
McClellan's proposed amendment." (citations omitted); see note 43 infra. 
37. The axiom that courts should endeavor to give statutory language that meaning that 
nurtures the policies underlying legislation is one that guides us when circumstances not 
plainly covered by the terms of a statute are subsumed by the underlying policies to which 
Congress was committed. Care must be taken, however, to respect the limits up to which 
Congress was prepared to enact a particular policy, especially when the boundaries of a 
statute are drawn as a compromise resulting from the countervailing pressures of other 
policies. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 297-98 (1970). 
38. Except for the proviso exempting "publicity, other than picketing," § 8(b)(4) broadly 
addresses all secondary union activity. Peaceful consumer picketing that follows the struck 
product is a form of secondary activity. 
39. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951), quoted in 
International Longshoremen's Assn. v. Allied Intl., Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 223 n.20 (1982). 
40. Picketing involving violence or physical intimidation is certainly coercive. See, e.g., 
Milk.wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941). 
Picketing that shuts off pick-ups and deliveries or servicing of a secondary business in violation 
of the § 8(b)(4)(i)(B) prohibition against "inducement or encouragement" of workers might 
also be described as coercive. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 
(1949). 
41. See note 45 infra and accompanying text; cf. Note, Picketing and Publicity Under Sec• 
tion 8(b)(4) of the LMRA, 13 YALE L.J. 1265, 1280-81 (1964)("While it is likely that most non• 
product picketing will in fact 'threaten, coerce, or restrain,' there might be some instances in 
which it will not.'') [hereinafter cited as Note, Picketing and Publicity]. 
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dary's sales, the Court in effect conclusively presumed that secon-
dary picketing in such cases can always "be expected to threaten [the 
secondary employer] with ruin or substantial loss,"42 and that section 
8(b)(4) therefore precluded such picketing as coercive. However, the 
dual objectives embodied in congressional regulation of secondary 
activity require a more careful balance. 
B. The Delicate Balance - Consumer Picketing and Neutral 
Parties 
The examples of secondary picketing that appear in the legisla-
tive history of the LMRDA typically include appeals to workers as 
well as consumers.43 The actual impact of purely consumer picket-
ing has been given little empirical or even anecdotal scrutiny,44 and 
has not been considered by the Board or the courts in their doctrinal 
analysis of the cases before them.45 Because Congress designed sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to balance the interests oflabor unions and secon-
dary employers,46 the courts should weigh the value of consumer 
picketing as a means to influence a primary employer against the 
actual impact that such picketing has on an affected secondary busi-
ness. Section 8(b )( 4) should be read to prohibit consumer picketing 
only when the actual harm to the secondary outweighs the union's 
legitimate interest in influencing the primary employer. 
42. 447 U.S. at 614; see Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812 v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252, 
1264 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Reading Tree Fruits in combination with [Sefeco ], we infer that a 
consumer boycott of a neutral business will 'threaten, coerce, or restrain' the neutral if it either 
exceeds the scope of the union's primary campaign or will foreseeably cause 'ruin or substan-
tial loss' to the neutral." (emphasis in original)). 
43. Senator McClellan's example concerning picketing of a merchant who has built a busi-
ness around one product, cited by Justice Powell inSefeco, 447 U.S. at 615 n.10, includes both 
interference with deliveries and a misleading picket sign (neither of these elements are noted in 
Justice Powell's opinion): 
The union may say to the merchant, "You cannot sell this product. If you do we will 
picket your place of business. Thus you will not be able to get your supplies, because the 
Teamsters will not cross the picketline." 
In addition, the merchant's customers ... would see the picket sign. What would the 
sign say? It would say "Unfair to Labor." 
105 CONG. R.E.c. 6667 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 29, at 1194; see note 36 
supra. 
44. See Brinker & Taylor, The Secondary Boycott Maze, 25 LAB. L.J. 418, 426 (1974). 
45. Neither the Board nor the court in Local 14055, United Steelworkers (Dow Chemical 
Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 694 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as 
moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), took into account the actual impact that the union's picketing had 
on the secondary businesses involved. Similarly, the Board heard Sefeco on a set of stipulated 
facts. See Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001 (Safeco Title Ins. Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 754 
(1976), revd., 627 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1979), revd., 441 U.S. 607 (1980). Safeco did not claim 
that the secondary title companies had in fact suffered substantial loss, nor did the Supreme 
Court require a showing that the picketing had caused an actual injury. q. Fruit & Vegetable 
Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 316 (1962) ("[T]he record does not show any injury 
to Safeway, the secondary employer. Indeed, Tree Fruits, not Safeway, is the charging party 
here."), qffd. on other grounds, 337 U.S. 58 (1964). 
46. See note 39 supra and accompanying text. 
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A realistic view of secondary picketing indicates that the union's 
appeal is closely associated with the primary dispute.47 The main 
purpose of such picketing is not to hurt the primary by cutting off 
sales at the secondary site, but rather to threaten the primary em-
ployer's public image by attracting attention to the dispute.48 This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that even where the primary 
product is sold nationally, secondary consumer picketing typically is 
often restricted to the vicinity of the primary dispute.49 
Another indication that the major value of consumer picketing 
lies in its publicity effect is the fact that picketed secondary busi-
nesses usually account for an insignificant portion of the primary's 
total sales.50 Thus, unions have little to gain by causing or threaten-
ing harm to the secondary employer, who has little leverage with 
which to influence the resolution of the primary dispute. 
In fact, consumer picketing rarely discourages large numbers of 
customers from purchasing the struck product.51 The image of the 
47. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 337 U.S. 58, 72 (1964) ("When con-
sumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to buy the struck product, the 
union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute."); see Engel, supra note 31, at 200-09 
(suggesting that principles of common site picketing be extended to following primary prod-
ucts as well as primary employees to the secondary site). 
48. See Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 
267, 283 (1941) ("Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication."); Com-
ment, The Landrum-Grf/lin Amendments: Labor's Use of Secondary Boycott, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 
724, 730-31 (1960) ("[O]rganized labor has consistently maintained that this picketing is 
designed solely to advertise to the public the sale of 'unfair' goods .... "); cf. Velvel, Freedom 
of Speech and the .Draft Card Burning Cases, 16 KAN. L. REV. 149, 153 (1968) ("Burning a 
draft card, like engaging in a civil rights demonstration, is the ordinary man's way of attracting 
the attention of the national news media and, through the media, of getting his views across to 
citizens at large."). 
Secondary picketing designed to attract public attention affects the primary dispute because 
corporations are increasingly concerned with cultivating their "public image." See Miller, 
Sprucing Up the Corporate Image, INDUSTRY WEEK, Aug. 23, 1982, at 35, 35. ''{Gjood public 
relations usually is taken for gn\.nted; it is when trouble strikes that poor PR gets notice - and 
inflicts damage." Id. at 41 (emphasis in original); Note, Invisible Hand, supra note 22, at 187. 
49. Although Safeco Title Insurance Co. had "61 principal company offices and over 650 
agents in 38 states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands," SAFECO CORP., 
1978 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (1979), picketing in that case was confined to 5 Seattle title compa-
nies local to the dispute. 447 U.S. at 609. In Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 
1980), striking workers of the Duro Paper Bag Manufacturing Co. picketed two supermarkets 
in Ludlow and Covington, Kentucky, the homes of the struck primary's factories. 
50. Safeco Corp. in 1978 had operating revenue in excess of Sl billion, and assets of over 
$2 billion. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 49, at 3. The Title Insurance division had pre-tax 
earnings of approximately $18 million. Id. at 24. The Duro Company, supra note 49, has 
plants in Tampa, Florida, Brownsville, Texas, and Hudson, Wisconsin, as well as the two 
factories in Kentucky. 10 THOMAS REGISTER OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS AND THOMAS 
REGISTER CATALOG FILE 559 (1982). Duro's bag sales to the two struck supermarkets were 
undoubtedly a minute portion of its total sales. 
51. See A. REES, supra note 1, at 43; Cook, Boycott/ Labor's Last Resort, INDUSTRY 
WEEK, June 28, 1976, at 23, 31; Note, Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 22. 
Facts gleaned from cases holding that secondary consumer picketing is coercive bear out 
the minimal economic impact that such picketing usually produces. In Local 140S5, United 
Steelworkers (Dow Chemical Co.), 211 N.L.R.B. 694 (1974), enforcement denied, 524 F.2d 853 
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powerful labor union wantonly ruining secondary businesses is 
largely a myth.52 Moreover, because boycotts are usually a last re-
sort in a labor dispute, the union may have as much to lose as the 
primary or secondary employers involved. 53 In short, secondary 
picketing does not always pose a serious economic threat to secon-
dary employers. 
This low level of actual injury must be weighed against the im-
portance that secondary picketing has to a union involved in a pri-
mary dispute. Consumer picketing is an excellent way to attract 
media attention to the dispute.54 Because of increased interrelation-
ship among businesses,55 declines in union membership,56 and re-
(D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 807 (1976), the effect of secondary picketing on 
retail gas stations was slight. None went out of business. Dow refused to negotiate with the 
union and no contract with the union was ever signed. Some of the striking employees re-
turned to Dow on salary, others never returned at all. After the Board enjoined the union's 
picketing, the local was disbanded. Telephone interview with Bill Wittbrodt, Staff Representa-
tive, Bay City Sub-District of District 29, United Steelworkers (Sept. 27, 1982). 
In Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1980), the court held that striking workers 
of Duro Paper Bag Manufacturing Co., by picketing Kroger supermarkets to request that cus-
tomers refuse to have their groceries packed in struck bags, had engaged in an unfair labor 
practice. The court held that the bags were integrated into Kroger's business, and in the ab-
sence of a practically available alternative, customers would boycott Kroger entirely. One 
supermarket had 2800 customers during two days of picketing; 85 requested boxes and 70 were 
accommodated. At a second store, out of 1500 customers, 65 requested boxes and 30 were 
accommodated. Most of the customers who were not given boxes took out their purchases in 
the struck bags. A few customers brought their own bags. One customer left without paying 
for her groceries after they were packed in the "scab bags." The court characterized the figures 
as showing that the supermarkets only had enough boxes to accommodate 2½% of their cus-
tomers, and reasoned that, if the boycott had been totally successful, Kroger would have suf-
fered substantial losses. 
In Safeco, employees went on strike on November 18, 1974. Picketing of the title search 
companies commenced February 19, 1975. The impact on the title insurance companies was 
minimal; none went out of business. No contract with the union was ever signed. Telephone 
interview with Jim Webster, Attorney of Record for the Union in Safeco (Sept. 29, 1982). See 
also note 107 infra. . 
Thus, available evidence suggests that the Court's presumption in Safeco, that secondary 
picketing of the single-product retailed "reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties 
with ruin or substantial loss," 447 U.S. at 614, is probably mistaken. 
52. As illustrated by Safeco and Dow Chemical, the union locals engaged in picketing are 
usually underdogs. Moreover, the prohibitions on interference with secondary employees ef-
fectively prevent unions from shutting down secondary businesses. See A. REES, supra note I, 
at 42. 
53. See Cook, supra note 51, at 28; Boycott af GE goods may prolong strike, Bus. WEEK, 
Nov. 29, 1969, at 32, 33. 
54. q: Kennedy, Political Boycotts, the Sherman Act, and the First Amendment: An Accom-
modation af Competing Interests, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 983, 1008 (1982) (picketing will attract 
some media coverage, although a boycott would be more likely to receive sustained coverage); 
notes 47-50 supra. 
55. This interrelationship manifests itself in a number of ways. First, corporate acquisi-
tions and mergers are increasing. See Note, Unions, Conglomerates, and Secondary Activity 
Under the NLRA, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 221, 237 n.98 (1980); Merger Fever Unabated, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 24, 1982, § 3, at 22, col. 3; Wayne, The Corporate Raiders, N.Y. Times, July 18, 
1982, § 6 (Magazine). Many secondary businesses held by larger corporations will thus have 
greater staying power if subject to consumer picketing. See Note, supra at 239. 
Second, since the passage of the LMRDA in 1959, the number of franchise-type arrange-
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duced union bargaining leverage,57 the public exposure generated by 
secondary picketing is essential to preserve the balance of power in 
labor management relations. Therefore, in order to accommodate 
the economic interests of affected neutrals with the union's right to 
pressure off ending primary employers, the courts should conclude 
that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibits consumer picketing only when 
the plaintiff employer can show that the secondary business has actu-
ally suffered substantial economic harm. This approach would ad-
vance the policy objectives underlying section 8(b)(4), and would 
also provide a realistic,58 narrow statutory interpretation that would 
be less likely to impinge upon constitutionally protected freedom of 
expression. 
II. "PUBLICITY, OTHER THAN PICKETING" - CONTENT, 
CONDUCT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
With the Supreme Court's decision in Thornhill v. Alabama ,59 
ments has skyrocketed. See H. BROWN, FRANCHISING I (1978). This circumstance is particu-
larly significant because the dominant-product retailer situation addressed in Safeco will most 
often involve a franchise relationship of some type. Because franchisees are "locked into" the 
franchisor, the choice that Justice Powell claimed was being forced upon the title insurance 
companies "between their survival and the severance of their ties with Safeco," 447 U.S. at 
615, simply does not exist. In both Sqfeco and J)ow Chemical, the secondary businesses had 
contractual obligations to deal exclusively with the primary employers. See also Bennett v. 
Local 456, Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, 459 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (picketing 
secondary businesses that were franchises obligated to purchase their supplies from primary). 
Picketing a secondary that is contractually obligated to deal only with the primary is arguably 
outside the literal prohibition of the statute - coercion to force one party to cease doing 
business with another - because the terms of the contract between the parties preclude cessa-
tion of the relationship. 
56. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NEWS RELEASE 81-446, 
CORRECTED DATA ON LABOR ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP-1980, 1-3 (Sept. 18, 1981); U.S. 
DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND 
EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979, 59-60 (1980) (union membership as percentage of total labor 
force declining). 
57. See R. Berenbeim, Labor Unions: Where Are They Heading? I in SHOULD THE FED• 
ERAL GOVERNMENT CURTAIL THE POWERS OF LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES?, H.R. 
Doc. No. 89, 97th 'Cong., 1st Sess. 185 (1981); Waldman, supra note 28, at 66; Zimmerman, 
supra note 4, at 79, 93. Compare Sarnoff, Picketing and the First Amendment: "Full Circle" and 
"Formal Surrender", 9 LAB. L.J. 889, 901 (1958) ("In part this is a reflection upon the ex• 
panding power oflabor organizations. • . . The Thornhill period has passed."), with Zimmer-
man, supra note 4, at 93 ("The technological, economic and political age in which we now live 
is markedly different from that in which Congress enacted Section 8(b)(4) in 1947 and 
amended in 1959."). 
58. Cf. International Bhd. ofT-eamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1950) 
("In [Swing, Wohl andAngelos ,] we held only that a State could not proscribe picketing merely 
by setting artificial bounds, unreal in the light of modern circumstances, to what constitutes an 
industrial relationship or a labor dispute." ( emphasis added)); Jones, Twilight Zone, supra note 
22, at 1007 ("Although some may feel that to be no more than a judicial flourish, the writer 
thinks it quite candidly states what has moved the Court .... "); cf. G. CALABRESI, A COM• 
MON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982) (suggesting that courts revise statutes in accord-
ance with changed conditions to prevent "statutorification"). 
59. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Although the holding was a narrow one, see St. Antoine, supra 
note 8, at 885-86, the Court clearly indicated in the companion case, Carlson v. California, 310 
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peaceful picketing assumed a place among the forms of expression 
protected by the first amendment. In subsequent years, however, the 
Court retreated from its position in Thornhi!l60 in a series of cases 
permitting state injunctions against picketing.61 Tree Fruits avoided 
the first amendment implications of "a broad ban against peaceful 
picketing,"62 but checked the erosion of the Thornhill doctrine. 
Tree Fruits, however, faileoro clarify the-confusiong~ner_~teclby 
the intervening decisions' unsystematic attempts63 to identify the cir-
cumstances under which peaceful secondary picketing deserved less 
than complete first amendment protection. 64 In Safeco, the Court 
U.S. 106 (1940), that Thornhill established that peaceful picketing is a means of communica-
tion protected by the first amendment: 
The carrying of signs and banners . . . is a natural and appropriate means of conveying 
information on matters of public concern .... For the reasons set forth in our opinion in 
Thornhill . . . , publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through appro-
priate means, . . . must now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is 
secured to every person by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state. 
310 U.S. at 112-13 (citations omitted). 
60. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, characterized the series of decisions following 
Thornh,11 as a realization by the Court "that the broad pronouncements, but not the specific 
holding, of Thornhill had to yield 'to the impact of facts unforeseen,' or at least not sufficiently 
appreciated." 354 U.S. at 289. Dissenting, Justice Douglas lamented that "[t)he Court has 
now come full circle .... The retreat became a rout .... Today, the Court signs the formal 
surrender." 354 U.S. at 295-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
61. See International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (pick-
eting to pressure employer to force its employees to join union); Local Union No. 10, United 
Assn. of Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing to pressure contrac-
tor to eliminate nonunion men from job); Building Serv. Employees Intl. Union, Local 262 v. 
Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (picketing to pressure employer to recognize union rejected by 
employees as bargaining representative); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 309 v. Hanke, 
339 U.S. 470 (1950) (picketing to force business run by owner without employees to become 
union shop); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) (picketing to force supermarket to 
hire minority employees); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1948) (picket-
ing to force business not to sell to nonunion distributors); Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 
No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942) (picketing of restaurant whose owner was having 
unrelated construction performed by nonunion labor). 
In Vogt, Justice Frankfurter reviewed these decisions in detail. He concluded that, while 
Thornhill continued to stand for the proposition that "blanket prohibitions against picketing" 
would be unacceptable, 354 U.S. at 294-99, "a state, in enforcing some public policy, whether 
of its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legislature or its courts, could 
constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy." 354 
U.S. at 293. Justice Douglas, however, pointed out in dissent that, "for practical purposes,'' 
Justice Frankfurter's approach left "[s]tate courts and state legislatures ... free to decide 
whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for any reason." 354 U.S. at 297 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens echoed this point in Safeco when he cautioned that if 
speech could be restricted "simply because it is in furtherance of objectives deemed unlawful 
by Congress ... the First Amendment would place no limit on Congress' power." 447 U.S. at 
618 (Steven, J., concurring). 
62. 377 U.S. at 63; see notes 7-12 supra and accompanying text. 
63. See Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REv. 574, 593 (1951) 
("[A)lthough the term 'picketing' is used over and over again in Supreme Court opinions as if 
it described a single type of conduct, in my judgment the course of decision will not be clarified 
until the Court analyzes the facts more closely."). 
64. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text .. 
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fared no better at finding a common constitutional rationale to jus-
tify section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)'s limitations on secondary picketing. Six 
justices proposed three different theories, none of which commanded 
a majority of the Court.65 
A. Unlawful Object 
Writing for the Court in Safeco, Justice Powell quickly dis-
missed66 the decision's potential constitutional infirmities.67 He ar-
gued that picketing calculated to persuade customers not to deal 
with the secondary employer68 "spreads labor discord by coercing a 
neutral party to join the fray."69 He concluded that the congres-
sional prohibition on "'picketing in furtherance of [such] unlawful 
objectives' did not offend the First Amendment."70 
An ''unlawful object," however, must be more than a mere la-
bel71 attached to ''the otherwise lawful expression of views in a par-
65. In addition, Justice Brennan dissented, sidestepping the first amendment issue as he 
had in Tree Fruits by emphasizing that secondary picketing confined to the struck product was 
really primary in nature. 447 U.S. at 619-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
66. See 447 U.S. at 616. 
Justice Blackmun described Justice Powell's one paragraph treatment of the constitutional 
question as a "cursory discussion of ... difficult First Amendment issues." 447 U.S. at 616 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens was also dissatisfied, observing that "[t]he consti-
tutional issue ... is not quite as easy as the plurality would make it seem." 447 U.S. at 618 
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 900 ("Justice Powell ... dis-
cussed this constitutional question in a single paragraph. This hardly seems adequate for 
resolving the conundrums bequeathed us by forty years of litigation and debate over the con-
stitutional status of picketing." (footnote omitted)). 
_67. This part of the opinion was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Stewart and Justice 
Rehnquist. 447 U.S. at 609. 
68. See notes 13-14Sllpra. 
69. 447 U.S. at 616. 
70. 447 U.S. at 616 (quoting International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 
705 (1951)). Justice Powell also cites American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U.S. 215 
(1974), and International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957), for 
this proposition. Electrical Workers and American Radio, however, both involved appeals to 
secondary employees to cease work; Vogt involved a Teamsters' picket line designed to coerce 
an employer to force its employees to join the Teamsters Union. Justice Powell fails to note 
"that Safeco was the first time the Supreme Court had ever clearly sustained a ban on peaceful 
and orderly picketing addressed to, and calling for seemingly lawful responses by, individual 
consumers acting on their own." St. Antoine, Sllpra note 8, at 901; f 
For a somewhat cynical explanation of the Court's analysis in Safeco, see Note, Peaceful 
Picketing, S11pra note 23, at 1481 (''The unlawful objective theory ..• all~ws legislatures to 
proscribe any picketing that is aimed at harming business_property, whil~g lip service to 
the requirements of the first amendment doctrine developea.fu~11!,0ry."). 
71. See NAACP v. Button, 317 U.S. 415 (1963), where the Court responded to "the con-
tention that 'solicitation' is wholly outside the area of freedoms protected by the First Amend-
ment" by observing that 
a state cannot foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels . . . . 
(A]bstract discussion is not the only species of co=unication which the Constitution 
protects; the First Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, 
against governmental intrusion. 
371 U.S. at429; cf. Mack & Lieberwitz,Sllpra note 12, at 819 (in Safeco, the Court ''went so far 
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ticular manner and at a particular location."72 Nor is a legislative 
conclusion that picketing is always coercive and therefore unlawful 
sufficient.73 As Justice Stevens observed inSqfeco, acceptance of the 
syllogism that secondary picketing has an unlawful object simply be-
cause Congress has so declared means that "the First Amendment 
would place no limit on Congress' power."74 
Picketing may, of course, be prohibited if it has an unlawful ob-
jective independent of the expression itself. In Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co. ,75 for example, a union representing ice peddlers 
picketed in an effort to persuade Empire not to sell ice to nonunion 
peddlers. If Empire had refused to sell, its action would have vio-
lated state antitrust laws.76 In contrast, the only unlawful aspect of 
the union's activity in Safeco was the act of picketing itself. Con-
sumer picketing is unlawful "only in a Pickwickian sense,"77 because 
neither the content of the union's appeal nor the response of the con-
sumers is itself unlawful.78 
Concurring in Tree Fruits, Justice Black, the author of Giboney, 
explained this key distinction. Section 8(b )( 4) differs from Giboney, 
in which picketers were forbidden "to help carry out an unlawful or 
criminal undertaking," becaJ1se . the section "contain1La_prc>Viso 
which says that it sh~-not be construed 'to prohibit publicity,_9Jger 
than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully-advising-the-public,...in-
cluding consumers . . . that a product or products are produced by 
an employer with whom ... [the picketers have] a primary dis-
pute.' "79 Justice Black concluded that selective restrictions based on 
as to defer to state control when the unlawful objective had not even been enunciated in the 
form of legislation"); Note, Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 23, at 942-43. 
72. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
73. See, e.g., 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 105, 166 A.2d 271, 276 (1960) ("[A] state 
may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, enjoin picketing which in a particular case has 
an objective which violates a legitimate clearly-defined law or public policy of the state. A 
state may not, however, constitutionally equate picketing itself with coercion or with a viola-
tion of state policy."). 
74. 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring); see note 60 supra; cf. International Bhd. of 
Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 297 (1957). 
75. 336 U.S. 490 (1948). 
76. "Thus all of appellants' activities - their powerful transportation combination, their 
patrolling, their formation of a picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their 
union membership, their publicizing - constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, 
which was in violation of Missouri's valid law." 336 U.S. at 498. 
77. A. Cox, FREEDOM OF Exl'RESSION 45 (1981). 
78. In effect, Safeco begs the question by equating picketing with illegal conduct. See 
Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 23, at 1479. 
79. 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring). Cf. NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46, 55 
(1964) ("The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the unions' free-
dom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safeguarded."); 105 CONG. 
REc. 15673 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 29, at 1615 (remarks of Rep. Griffin) 
("Of course, this bill and any other bill is limited by the constitutional right of free speech."); 
id. at 17899, 2 LEG. HIST. at 1432 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("[T]he union can hand out 
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the content of the picketers' message constituted censorship of ideas 
rather than regulation of conduct: 
In short, we have neither a case in which picketing is banned because 
the picketers are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in 
which all picketing is, for reasons of public order, banned. Instead, we 
have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only when 
the picketers express particular views. The result is an abridgment of 
the freedom of these picketers to tell a part of the public their side of a 
labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by 
the First Amendment. 80 
Justice Black soon repeated these views in a nonlabor picketing case, 
Cox v. Louisiana .81 
The Court adopted Justice Black's position in Police .Department 
v. Mosley,82 and reaffirmed it in Carey v. Brown,83 decided the same 
day as Safeco. In those cases, regulations prohibiting all but labor 
picketing in particular locations were held unconstitutional as con-
tent based restrictions on expression.84 Justice Blackmun pointed 
handbills at the shop, can place advertisements in newspapers, can make announcements over 
the radio . . . ."). 
80. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 79 (Black, J., concurring), 
Justice Black addressed the constitutional issue in his concurrence because he agreed with 
Justice Harlan's conclusion in dissent that the legislative history indicated a congressional in-
tent to prohibit all secondary picketing. 377 U.S. at 76 (Black, J., concurring), The LMRDA 
does not merely distinguish labor from nonlabor picketing. It also permits certain forms of 
labor picketing, depending on the message of the picketers' appeal. A proviso to§ 8(b){7)(C) 
permits picketing "for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that 
an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization." 29 
U.S.C. § l58(b)(7)(C) (1976). Thus, the statute permits a union to ask customers not to patron• 
ize a business employing nonunion labor, but does not allow the union to ask customers not to 
buy from a business selling struck goods. See also Soft Drink Workers Local 812 v. NLRB, 
657 F.2d 1252, 1272 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) {Wald, J., dissenting); 105 CONG, REC, at 17899, 2 
LEG. HlsT., supra note 29, at 1432 (dialogue between Senators Goldwater and Kennedy) 
("buy-America" campaigns not covered by§ 8(b)(4)). 
81. [B]y specifically permitting picketing for the publication oflabor union views, Loui-
siana is attempting to pick and choose among the views it is willing to have discussed on 
its streets. It thus is trying to prescribe by law what matters of public interest people 
whom it allows to assemble on its streets may and may not discuss. This seems to me to 
be censorship in a most odious form, unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring). 
82. 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972). 
83. 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
84. In Cox, the Court overturned convictions under statutes prohibiting breach of the 
peace, obstructing public passages, Cox I, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), and courthouse picketing, Cox 
II, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). Justice Black concurred in Cox I, in part because the obstruction 
statute excepted labor picketing. 379 U.S. at 580 (Black, J., concurring) ("I believe that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments require that if the streets of a town are open to some views, 
they must be open to all."). He dissented in Cox II because the statute, for the legitimate 
purpose of protecting judicial integrity, proscribed courthouse picketing by "anyone, under 
any conditions." 379 U.S. at 581-84 (Black, J., dissenting). In Mosley and Carey, statutes that 
prohibited picketing in order to prevent disturbances of schools and residential neighborhoods 
contained exceptions for labor picketing. The Court treated these cases as equal protection 
problems. See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. 
Cm. L. REv. 20 (1975). The Court concluded that the justifications proffered by the City of 
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out that the Court in Safeco failed to explain why "[section] 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) imposes no impermissible restrictions upon constitu-
tionally protected speech"85 in light of Mosley and Carey. In short, 
the use of the unlawful object test to justify section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)'s 
purported prohibition of single-product secondary picketing argua-
bly creates an impermissible content-based regulation.86 
B. Substantial Government Interest 
Even if the first amendment does protect labor picketing by pre-
cluding content-based regulation, statutory control may still be justi-
Chicago in Mosley (that "as a class, nonlabor picketing is more prone to produce violence than 
labor picketing," Mosley, 408 U.S. at HJO), and the State of Illinois in Carey (that a resident 
has " 'waived' his right to be free from picketing with respect to disputes arising out of the 
employment relationship," Carey, 447 U.S. at 468) were insufficient to justify selective restric-
tions on protected expression. Because the statutes were not narrowly drawn to accomplish 
their purposes, they were impermissibly over- and under-inclusive. See Mosely, 408 U.S. at 95 
n.3; Carey, 447 U.S. at 465 n.9 (citing Kalven, supra note 22, at 29); cf. Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (antipicketing ordinance, virtually identical to that in Mosley, 
held invalid; but antinoise ordinance, prohibiting noisy disturbance adjacent to school while 
school is in session, held valid); Karst, supra, at 37-38 ("[The city faces] an apparent dile=a. 
If [it] bars all picketing within a certain area, it will effectively discriminate against those 
groups that can co=unicate to their audience only by picketing within that area. But if the 
city adjusts its ordinance to this differential impact, as by providing a student-picketing or 
labor-picketing exemption, ... [it runs] afoul of Mosley itself. The city can avoid the di-
le=a by amending the ordinance to ban not all picketing but only noisy picketing."). 
85. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616;see 447 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]his case 
fails to take account of the effect of this Court's decision in [Mosley] on the question whether 
the National Labor Relations Act's content-based ban on peaceful picketing of secondary em-
ployers is constitutional. The failure to take Mosley into account is particularly ironic given 
that the Court today reaffirms and extends the principles of that case in Carey v. 
Brown . ... "); cf. 447 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T)his is another situation in 
which regulation of the means of expression is predicated squarely on its content."). 
In Carey, the Court cited Professor Emerson for the proposition that ''non-labor picketing 
is more akin to pure expression than labor picketing and thus should be subject to fewer re-
strictions." Carey, 447 U.S. at 466 (citing T. EMERSON, supra note 22, at 444-49). Professor 
Emerson, however, uses "labor'' and "non-labor picketing" as terms of art, connoting whether 
the picketing seeks to persuade the general public or to coerce union members: 
Not all labor picketing can be described as action. It may, as in the Fruit and Vegetable 
Packers case, be similar in its impact to non-labor picketing and classified as expres-
sion. . . . Thus expression designed to persuade customers, to put pressure on automo-
bile dealers, to convince General Motors, to refuse to advertise on a radio station . . . 
would be protected . . . . Likewise, the fact that the objective of the economic pressure 
was contrary to "public policy" . . . would not be grounds for restriction. 
T. EMERSON, supra note 22, at 445, 449. 
86. Picketing of retail businesses may not involve a labor dispute at all, but may be a 
protest by consumers. See, e.g., Concerned Consumers League v. O'Neill, 371 F. Supp. 644 
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (informational picketing in front of furniture store by consumer organization 
protesting objectionable business practices); 1621, Inc. v. Wilson, 402 Pa. 94, 166 A.2d 271 
(1961) (residents protesting transfer of liquor license to neighborhood tavern picketed the tav-
ern). Although the business involved is harmed in either case, nonlabor picketing is protected 
by the first amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409 
(1982). Thus, the justification for the ban on dominant-product secondary picketing - pro-
tecting neutral businesses - is undercut in the same way that the policy justifications in Cox, 
Mosley, and Carey were upset by labor exceptions to general prohibitions on picketing. 
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fled if it directly advances a substantial government interest. 87 This 
conclusion is especially important as applied to labor activities be-
cause the "Court has recognized the strong governmental interest in 
certain forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation 
may have an incidental effect on rights of speech and association."88 
But even economic regulations are closely examined. Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 89 decided the 
same day as Safeco, provides a good example of the scrutiny with 
which the Court reviews content-based restrictions on commercial 
speech. A Public Service Commission regulation on electric utility 
advertising prohibited "promotional" advertising while permitting 
"institutional and informational advertising."90 The Commission 
argued that its interest in energy conservation justified the restric-
tion. Although the case dealt with commercial speech, an area re-
ceiving less than full first amendment protection,91 the Court struck 
down the regulation after placing a heavy burden of justification on 
the Commission. "In the absence of authoritative findings to the con-
trary, we must credit as within the realm of possibility that electric 
heat can be an efficient alternative in some circumstances."92 Thus, 
without objective data that the regulation was needed in all cases in 
order to achieve its purpose, the Court found a blanket restriction 
unconstitutional. If the actual impact of consumer picketing on sec-
ondary businesses was subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as 
the Court applied in Central Hudson, the constitutional validity of 
the Court's reading of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in Safeco would be cast 
into serious doubt. 
Admittedly, the Court might pay greater deference to Congress 
than the New York Public Service Commission in scrutinizing an 
asserted "substantial government interest." Indeed, Justice Black-
mun concurred "reluctantly" in Safeco because he was hesitant to 
87. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972); accord, NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982). In characterizing "the quality of the governmental 
interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compel• 
ling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong." United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
88. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3425 (1982). Citing Safeco, the 
Court indicated that secondary picketing was included among the economic activities that 
Congress has a strong interest in regulating. 102 S. Ct. at 3425. 
89. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
90. 447 U.S. at 558-61. 
91. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 771-72 n.24 (1976) ("In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment pro• 
tection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms . . • . Even if the 
differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, . . • they none-
theless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary .••. "); cf. Village of Hoffman 
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982) ("[T]he overbreadth doc-
trine does not apply to commercial speech."). 
92. 447 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added). 
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hold section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) unconstitutional in light of the "substan-
tial government interests" involved in the balance struck by Con-
gress between ''union freedom of expression and the ability of 
neutral employers, employees and consumers to remain free from 
coerced participation in industrial strife."93 Nevertheless, the inter-
est asserted by Justice Blackmun in Safeco is virtually unsupport-
able. First, Congress evidently did little actual ''weighing" of the 
relative interests that unions and secondary businesses have in 
peaceful consumer picketing.94 Second, the relative bargaining 
power of labor and management has shifted in favor of the latter 
since passage of the LMRDA in 1959.95 Third, no empirical data 
demonstrates that such picketing has a significant impact on secon-
dary businesses;96 to the contrary, existing evidence indicates that 
consumer picketing is not likely to have such an impact.97 These 
considerations minimize the purported "substantial" government in-
terest in regulating dominant-product secondary picketing. 
Even where a substantial governmental interest is present, the 
Court has required that any regulations with first amendment impli-
cations be "narrowly drawn" in order to advance directly the interest 
being served.98 In Safeco, the Court ruled that once a secondary 
employer's dependence on the primary's product reached a certain 
level,99 the state's interest in preserving the neutrality of the secon-
dary justified an automatic ban on peaceful consumer picketing 
aimed at the struck product. In particular instances, satisfactory 
proof that peaceful consumer picketing significantly injured a secon-
dary employer might constitute a substantial government interest100 
93. Sefeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
94. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text. Professor Cox, who assisted Senator 
Kennedy during debates on the bill, has suggested that, rather than carefully weighing inter-
ests, legislators who had not realized that the bill reached consumer picketing only acquiesced 
to such a reading as a matter of political convenience after a television address by President 
Eisenhower raised the issue. Cox, supra note 29, at 274. 
95. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text. 
96. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. 
97. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
98. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 564-66 
(1980); Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972) ("The Equal Protection Clause requires 
that statutes affecting First Amendment interests be narrowly tailored to their legitimate 
objectives."). 
99. In Sefeco, the secondaries derived over 90% of their gross incomes from the sale of the 
primary product. Sefeco, 447 U.S. at 609. 
100. See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972) ("Predictions about imminent 
disruption from picketing involve judgments appropria~ely made on an individualized basis, 
not by means of broad classifications, especially those based on subject matter."); Note, Picket-
ing and Publicity,supra note 41, at 1281 (suggesting that the Court of Appeals' standard in Tree 
Fruits, requiring an actual showing that "a substantial economic impact on the secondary has 
occurred or is likely to occur,'' Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311, 
317 (D.C. Cir. 1962), ajfd. on other grounds, 377 U.S. 58 (1964), is the appropriate test for 
"actual coercion"). 
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in prohibiting such picketing. Given the real objectives and impact 
of consumer picketing, however, Safeco's categorical prohibition of 
dominant-product secondary picketing renders section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) 
overbroad. 
C. Speech-Plus 
The Supreme Court has often attempted to distinguish picketing 
from other forms of first amendment expression on the ground that it 
is part speech and part conduct. This "speech-plus" concept of pick-
eting originated in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Bakery 
.Drivers Local No. 802 v. Wohl. 101 He observed that "the very pres-
ence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite 
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dissemi-
nated."102 Justice Stevens based his concurrence in Safeco on this 
argument, observing that, "[i]n the labor context, it is the conduct 
element rather than the particular idea being expressed that often 
provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons about to 
enter a business establishment."103 
Where the government has regulated the conduct element of an 
activity also involving speech, the Court has required that the regu-
lation shield as much as possible the communicative aspect of the 
activity. 104 In the case of peaceful secondary picketing, any effect 
attributable to the conduct rather than the communicative element is 
so incidental that it is outweighed by the first amendment interests at 
stake. 105 
The conventional notion of signal picketing, in which the picket 
101. 315 U.S. 769 (1942). Justice Douglas explicitly uses the term "speech-plus" to de• 
scribe picketing in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 455 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
102. 315 U.S. at 776 (Douglas, J., concurring); accord International Bhd. of Teamsters, 
Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284,289 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460,465 
(1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 503 n.6 (1949). 
103. Sefeco, 441 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
104. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968): 
(A] government regulation is sufficiently justified ifit is within the constitutional power of 
the Government, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest. 
See also note 98 supra. 
105. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964) ("[I]t is 
urged, all picketing automatically provokes the public to stay away from the picketed estab-
lishment. The public will, it is said, neither read the signs and handbills, nor note the explicit 
injunction that 'This is not a strike against any store or market.' Be that as it may, our holding 
today simply takes note of the fact that Congress has never adopted a broad condemnation of 
peaceful picketing .... ");cf.Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L, 
RE.v. 1363, 1412-14 (1962) (suggesting that incidental economic harm from a secondary activ-
ity which would also be a by-product of successful primary activity should not be prohibited; 
only "harms of a different kind" such as interference with employees or service and customer 
access should be subject to restrictions). 
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line is inviolable to union members and is backed by threats of fines 
or expulsion, is inapposite to the facts of Sefeco. 106 Consumers who 
are nonunion members will not respond to such sanctions. And, al-
though secondary picket lines are "[t]heoretically . . . entitled to the 
same respect from union members as any other picket line, . . . as a 
practical matter the union's sanctions play little part. . . . [U]nion 
members feel freer to exercise the freedom of choice open to the gen-
eral public."107 
In Tree Fruits, Justice Harlan suggested three ways in which the 
labor picket line may have a "signal-like" effect on consumers unre-
lated to the content of its appeal. 108 The first is ideological. The 
customer automatically responds to the picket line because of union 
sympathies, rather than the persuasiveness of the appeal in the par-
ticular dispute. The second is by intimidation. The customer, wish-
ing to avoid confrontation with the picketers, simply chooses to shop 
elsewhere.109 The last signal effect results from the public's inability 
to "ascertain the precise scope of a particular picketing opera-
tion."110 The consumer sees a picket line from a distance and, 
presuming a primary labor dispute, avoids the business, never ascer-
taining the limited scope of the picketers' appeal. 111 Each of these 
arguments is unrealistic, constitutionally flawed, or both. 
The ideological "automatic response to a signal, rather tha.u a 
reasoned response to an idea," 112 is the least satisfactory basis, both 
106. See A. Cox,supra note 77, at 47 ("In Local 1001, the picketing was neither threaten-
ing nor a signal setting in motion a prearranged combination to exercise concerted economic 
power backed by fear of union discipline . . . ."). 
107. Id. at 46; see also Raskin, Is the Picket Line Obsolete?, SAT. REV./WORLD, Oct. 19, 
1974, at 12, 15 (picketing by union engaged in jurisdictional dispute) ("The pickets kept 
marching year after frustrating year without interrupting flights or noticeably discouraging 
patronage. Among Eastem's passengers, especially on its Washington-New York shuttle, were 
many top officers of the AFL-CIO."). 
108. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 82-83 (1964) 
(Harlan, J ., dissenting): 
Because of the very nature of picketing there may be numbers of persons who will refuse 
to buy at all from a picketed store, (1) either out of economic or social conviction or 
(2) because they prefer to shop where they need not brave a picket line. Moreover, (3) the 
public can hardly be expected always to know or ascertain the precise scope of a particu-
lar picketing operation. 
109. Cf. A. Cox, supra note 77, at 45 ("I wish that Justice Stevens had elaborated upon 
'conduct' and 'deterrent.' When I pressed a similar argument upon the Court in [Tree Fruits), 
counsel for the Teamsters Union exhibited photographs of the pickets; they were slightly built, 
white-haired and gentle, elderly ladies. 'How,' he cried, 'did their conduct influence anyone 
apart from the ideas expressed?' "). 
110. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
111. Cf. Comment, Interdependent Parties, supra note 34, at 627 ("[O)n the facts of a case 
such as Safeco ... [, w]hether consumers boycott the establishment or its sole product, the 
effect on the secondary party will be the same. However, in a setting such as Tree Fruits -
where the struck product is but one of many the secondary sells - the Tree Fruits rule may 
lead to far greater damage to the secondary party than would a successful strike of the primary 
party."). 
112. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
1838 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 81:1817 
logically and constitutionally, on which to justify the section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) prohibition. Consumer response to labor picketing is 
no less reasoned, 113 and the effect on secondary businesses no less 
harmful, 114 than that caused by competitive commercial advertising, 
which the first amendment does protect. 115 Picketing deserves even 
greater protection than commercial speech because it "is economi-
cally self-interested speech with a political dimension."116 Where 
picket lines are effective in persuading consumers to follow their ap-
peal, it is not because they "have some mysterious and talismanic 
significance, but because management has for the time being lost the 
debate for the loyalties of the American public concerning labor dis-
putes in general, or as to the particular labor dispute involved." 117 
Some authorities have tried to distinguish picketing from other 
forms of protected speech by labelling it "mere sloganeering" that 
"involves no intellectual appeal, no exchange of ideas." 118 Justice 
Stevens implies as much in his Safeco concurrence when he writes: 
"Indeed, no doubt the principal reason why handbills containing the 
same message are so much less effective than labor picketing is that 
the former depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea." 119 
Although handbills may contain more detailed versions of the 
messages displayed on picket signs, the constitutionality of a 
message does not tum on its complexity. The Court has held that 
slogans ("Live Free or Die")120 and even epithets expressing political 
views ("F - the Draft"), 121 are first amendment speech. 122 Simi-
larly, " 'Unfair,' 'Scabs,' and 'Do Not Patronize' call for no more of a 
Pavlovian response than the gaudy bumper stickers' 'Vote Demo-
cratic' and 'Vote Republican' . . . ."123 Thus, the notion that pick-
113. See A. Cox, supra note 77, at 47. 
114. See Dodd, supra note 22, at 514; Note, Picketing and Commercial Speech, supra note 
23, at 960. 
115. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), 
116. Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 23, at 1486. 
117. BriefAmicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Educational Fund, Inc. 
at 46-47, NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as NAACP Brief]. 
118. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 892. See, e.g., Teller, Picketing and Free Speech, 56 
HARV. L. REV. 180, 201, 202 (1942). 
119. Sefeco, 441 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
120. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (right to refrain from speaking entitled 
owner to cover state motto on car license plate). 
121. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
122. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973) (civil service regulation prohib-
iting political activity interpreted to encompass buttons and bumper stickers might be 
over broad). , 
123. St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 892. Compare Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 
465 (1950) (''The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those 
flowing from appeals by printed word."), with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) 
("(M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only ideas 
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eting produces an irrational response is a constitutionally insufficient 
rationale for its control under the speech-plus doctrine. 
Justice Harlan's second concern, that a picket line would tum 
away customers wishing to avoid a confrontation with union mem-
bers, is also an inadequate constitutional justification for regulation 
of consumer picketing. As a practical matter, secondary businesses 
are unlikely to be harmed by picketing perceived as coercive by cus-
tomers. In part as a result of the more critical contemporary attitude 
of the public toward labor unions, 124 coercive picketing may very 
well produce a consumer backlash in response to the union's ap-
peal.125 This point is particularly relevant because unions more 
often use picketing as a publicity device than as an instrument of 
economic coercion, 126 and thus will be careful to insure that their 
message is favorably presented. Even if picketing did deter some 
faint-hearted souls from approaching the secondary business, protec-
tion from mere embarrassment or annoyance has never been ac-
corded constitutional status, 127 and thus does not justify curtailment 
capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as 
well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force."). 
124. See notes 130-33 infra and accompanying text. 
125. In Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405, 106 P.2d 41 l (1940), the court quotes 
from the American Federation of Labor as amicus curiae: " 'It may very well be . . . that the 
public would choose to give the merchant the benefit of their custom in an even greater meas-
ure ... in the case of a dispute in which the workers' position is unjust ... .'" 16 Cal. 2d at 
409, 106 P.2d at 413. Although the union's argument may have been somewhat disingenuous 
at the time, it is not today. See Testing Labor's "Ultimate Weapon", Bus. WEEK, July 25, 1964, 
at 50, 56 (During boycott of Judy Bond products, while some stores' sales fell by 20-40% below 
the previous year's, one store's sales rose by 80%; "Clearly, [that store's] customers are indiffer-
ent if not antagonistic to the boycott."); cf. Church, Slinging Mud and Money, TIME, Nov. 15, 
1982, at 43 (suggesting that candidates in 1982 elections perceived as having engaged in exces-
sive mudslinging or campaign spending experienced a voter backlash). 
An underlying explanation for this response is suggested by psychological reactance theory, 
which posits that individuals will resist any attempt that they perceive as limiting their free-
dom of choice. See J. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 3-15 (1966). 
Brehm conducted an experiment in which he handed supermarket shoppers cards with 
quarters attached as they entered the store. Half the cards politely requested the recipient to 
purchase a particular loaf of bread on sale for 25 cents, the other half vehemently did so. 
Seventy percent of those receiving polite cards purchased the bread, compared to only fifty 
percent receiving vehement cards. The next day, on the theory that a bribe is perceived as an 
attempt to limit choices that will trigger reactance, the experiment was repeated with an addi-
tional dime added to both cards. The rate of purchases dropped to forty percent for both 
groups. J. BREHM, supra, at 82-90. 
126. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. 
127. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3424 (1982) ("Speech 
does not lose its protected character, however, simply because it may embarrass others or co-
erce them into action."); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) 
("Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the public aware of respondent's 
real estate practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the views and practices of 
petitioners are no doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are peaceful, the com-
munication need not meet standards of acceptability.''); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 
301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937) ("It is true that disclosure of the facts of the labor dispute may be 
annoying to Senn even if the method and means employed in giving the publicity are inher-
ently unobjectionable. But such annoyance, like that often suffered from publicity in other 
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of freedom of speech. 128 
As to Justice Harlan's third concern, an automatic association be-
tween a picket line in front of a secondary business and a primary 
labor dispute is less likely and significant than it once may have 
been. Although picketing may have been predominantly a labor tac-
tic when the LMRDA was passed in 1959, the popularization of 
mass picketing as a means of social protest has divorced the picket 
line from its association with labor disputes. 129 Moreover, in part as 
a result of the publicizing of union corruption 130 and a perception 
that the nation's economic ills are attributable to "greedy" unions,131 
public perceptions about unions have changed for the worse. 132 The 
public today is much more likely than in times past to examine pick-
connections, is not an invasion of the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution."). See also St. 
Antoine, supra note 8, at 891 ("[I]f the actions or the gestures of the pickets can properly be 
classified as physically threatening or intimidating, then there is a problem in the law of as-
sault, not the first amendment."). 
128. See St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 892-93 ("[W]hile one can sympathize with those who 
resent being accosted by strangers with peremptory demands, or being forced to make deci-
sions under the gaze of a beady pair of eyes, on balance, the existence of such mildly discom-
fiting social pressures should not outweigh the speaker's right to deliver the message in 
person." (footnote omitted)). 
129. See Raskin,supra note 107, at 17 ("[T]he real dent in popular acceptance of the 'never 
cross' doctrine resulted . . . from the pirating of their technique by groups representing all 
shades of political sentiment. Mass picketing demonstrations for everything from banning the 
bomb to banning birth control have carried the process to a point of self-defeat."); St. Antoine, 
supra note 8, at 892 ("[Picketing] may, indeed, have nothing to do with a labor dispute at all 
but rather be the instrument for a racial group to protest segregation or cuts in welfare pay-
ments, or for a religious group to protest objectionable motion pictures." (footnote omitted)); 
note 86 supra. 
130. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REC. 6668-70 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 29, at 
I 194-97 (remarks of Senators Curtis, Kennedy and McClellan concerning the Teamsters, rack-
eteering and abuse of the secondary boycott); Bohlander & Werther, The Labor-Management 
Reporting and .Disclosure Act Revisited, 30 LAB. L.J. 582, 583 (1979) (''The McClellan Commit-
tee, also known as the McClellan Anti-Racketeering Committee, captured the public's atten-
tion through widespread television and print coverage of union racketeering, corruption, and 
other abuses in the labor-management field."); Raskin, supra note 107, at 16 (''The televised 
Senate hearings on labor-management rackets in the late Fifties left indelible memories of the 
frequency with which hoodlums hiding behind union buttons used strikes as vehicles of extor-
tion or exploitation."). Bui see Freeman & Medoff, The Two Faces of Unionism, 57 Pun. 
INTEREST, Fall 1979, at 69, 88 ("Many unions are alleged to be run by bosses or racketeers. 
But while the monopoly view has been highly publicized, the vast majority of evidence appears 
to support the voice view that unions generally are democratic political organizations and are 
responsive to the will of their members."). 
131. See Freeman_& Medoff, supra note 130, at 70. 
132. In the 1930's and 1940's, unions were at the center of attention among intellectuals, 
with most social scientists viewing them as an important positive force in society. In re-
cent years, unionism has become a more peripheral topic and unions have come to be 
viewed less positively. Less and less space in social-science journals and in magazines and 
newspapers is devoted to unions. . . . And what is written is increasingly unfavorable. 
The press often paints unions as organizations which are socially unresponsive, elitist, 
nondemocratic, or ridden with crime. 
Id. at 69-70. The decreased attention and public approval being received by unions does not 
merely suggest that the picket line has lost its sanctity. It also indicates that if a union is to 
reach the public with its message, it must earn public support. 
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eters' messages with a critical eye before acceding to union appeals 
for support. 133 Thus, Justice Harlan's fear that the public will con-
found primary and secondary labor disputes is not supported in fact, 
much less in constitutional theory. 
In the final analysis, the picket sign is merely a particularly eff ec-
tive means of reaching the public as well as attracting the media. It 
is targeted specifically at those to whom its message is relevant; it 
conveys the message quickly, boldly, and inexpensively; it reaches 
those who might not otherwise have read a handbill, and does so 
before they enter the business involved.134 The mere fact that pick-
eting may be a particularly persuasive method of conveying a 
message does not justify its regulation. 135 Moreover, the alleged 
availability of alternative means of communication 136 does not war-
rant removal of peaceful consumer picketing from the scope of first 
amendment protection. 137 Secondary picketing is an important and 
effective way for unions to publicize a primary labor dispute. The 
government's interest in forestalling economic discord does not jus-
tify a flat prohibition of such picketing, even when it involves a dom-
inant-product secondary. 
133. See Raskin, supra note 107, at 12. 
134. See NAACP Brief, supra note 117, at 43-44. 
135. See First Natl. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (potentially dispropor-
tionate influence of corporate spending against referenda); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(potential for disproportionate influence through campaign spending); Mills v. Alabama, 384 
U.S. 214 (1966) (state regulation prohibiting election-day editorials); cf. Central Hudson Gas 
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm.n., 447 U.S. 557, 581 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The 
justification for the regulation is nothing more than the expressed fear that the audience may 
find the utility's message persuasive."); Central Hudson, 441 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring) ("[A]bsent clear and present danger, government has no power to restrict expression 
because of the effect its message is likely to have on the public."); Organization for a Better 
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (''The claim that the expressions were intended to 
exercise a coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach of the First 
Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence respondent's conduct by their activities; 
this is not fundamentally different from the function of a newspaper."); Mack & Lieberwitz, 
supra note 12, at 816-17; Note, Peaceful Picketing, supra note 23, 1493-94. 
136. Compare Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 80 (Black, J., concurring) ("First Amendment free-
doms can no more validly be taken away by degree than by one fell swoop."), with 377 U.S. at 
93 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (''The decision of Congress to prohibit secondary consumer picket-
ing during labor disputes is, I believe, not inconsistent with the protections of the First Amend-
ment, particularly when, as here, other methods of co=unication are left open."). 
137. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) ("[O]ne is not to have the exer-
cise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be 
exercised in some other place."), with Fortenbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 405, 409, 106 
P.2d 411, 413 (1940) ("Obviously, the establishment where a product is sold is the only effec-
tive point where the consumer may be told the facts concerning a labor controversy."). 
The alternative means argument is least persuasive where the regulated mode of co=uni-
cation is co=only associated with the user and the best means available, as with labor picket-
ing. Cf. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 525 (1981) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (co=ercial speech on billboards); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 
431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) ("For Sale" signs on real estate sites). 
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Ill. JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND NARROW CONSTRUCTION -
REHABILITATING SECTION 8(b )( 4)(ii)(B) 
The rules that have developed around section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) must 
now be placed within a coherent statutory and constitutional frame-
work. The Court has required that regulations limiting first amend-
ment speech directly advance the interest involved and be no 
broader than necessary to serve that interest. 138 Therefore, section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) should be construed to minimize interference with sec-
ondary consumer picketing while at the same time carrying out the 
congressional objective of protecting "neutral employers, employees 
and consumers."139 This Note suggests that the prohibitory lan-
guage should only reach consumer picketing that (1) violates estab-
lished "time, place and manner'' conduct restrictions, 140 or (2) causes 
actual and significant economic loss to the secondary employer. 
Three conduct restrictions, based on past Board and court deci-
sions, balance the interests of unions and neutral parties in cases of 
secondary consumer picketing. First, picketers should not physically 
intimidate or obstruct customers of the secondary business. 141 This 
rule actually furthers the union's purpose of gaining public sup-
port142 by minimizing potential consumer "backlash", 143 while pro-
tecting the neutral's business from undue interference. 
Second, picketers should clearly identify the primary employer in 
the dispute. 144 This rule furthers the union's objective of drawing 
138. See notes 98-100 supra and acco·mpanying text. 
139. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607,618 (1980) (Black-
mun, J., concurring). Although consumers deserve protection from physical coercion, their 
right to receive information concerning the marketplace is an important one as well: 
It was observed in Thornhill that "the practices in a single factory may have economic 
repercussions upon a whole region and affect widespread systems of marketing." ... As 
to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that inter-
est may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent poltical 
debate. 
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 
(1976). 
140. The Court first explored this concept in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
See Kalven, supra note 22, at 25-27. 
141. This rule should be subject to a simple factual inquiry with no presumptions of intent 
or cause-and-effect. Compare Service & Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399, 136 
N.L.R.B. 431 (1962) (intent to restrain and harass inferred from number of men patrolling), 
with Soft Drink Workers Union Local 812, 243 N.L.R.B. 801, 808 (1979) (General Counsel's 
argument for inference rejected since no evidence was presented that any customers were actu-
ally hindered). 
142. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text. 
143. See notes 130-33 supra and accompanying text. 
144. This requirement is one that the Board has been imposing under its "vague signs" 
doctrine. Thus, even a sign at a secondary site correctly identifying the primary employer, but 
having the words, "On Strike," in much larger print than the rest, was held to create the 
possibility of a misimpression to the casual passerby that the secondary employer was exper-
iencing a strike. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 125 N.L.R.B. 531, 534-35 (1959). 
August 1983] Note - Secondary Consumer Picketing 1843 
attention to the primary dispute, 145 but protects the secondary em-
ployer from the potentially harmful misimpression that it is involved 
in a primary labor dispute. 
Third, the picketers should limit their appeal to the extent practi-
cable to the primary product. Although this rule is a mod!fied re-
statement of the Tree Fruits doctrine, this Note does not advocate it 
on the basis of a phantom distinction in the legislative history. Its 
purpose is to minimize economic harm to disinterested producers 
selling products to the secondary as well as to the secondary itself, 
while abolishing the "merged products" doctrine. That doctrine 
covers cases in which a product or service provided by the primary 
employer does not account for a large percentage of the secondary's 
sales but has become fully integrated with products or services of-
fered by the secondary. In these cases, courts have prohibited secon-
dary picketing, reasoning that it would inevitably produce a total 
boycott of the neutral's business.146 However, secondary picketing is 
designed to publicize primary disputes, not to harm secondary busi-
nesses, and rarely dissuades consumers from purchasing the struck 
product.147 Prohibiting picketing in these cases unduly inhibits the 
ability of the union to carry its appeal to the public.148 Therefore, 
this Note proposes that picketing be permitted in merged product 
cases, relying upon the actual harm rule to protect secondary 
employers. 
The actual harm rule still must be reconciled with the first 
amendment doctrine of content-based discrimination, because it 
does involve potential limitations upon speech. Labor picketing ar-
guably is further from the "core" of first amendment values than 
145. See notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See note 14 supra. 
147. See notes 47-53 supra and accompanying text. 
148. See, e.g., People v. Muller, 286 N.Y. 281, 36 N.E.2d 206 (1941) (secondary picketing 
of retail store by striking burglar alarm service workers). The court in Muller regarded its 
decision in Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 (1937), as controlling. Justice 
Brennan cited Goldjinger in Tree Fruits as one of the leading state cases establishing the dis-
tinction between limited and general secondary consumer picketing. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7. 
The treatment of secondary picketing under the merged products doctrine differs sharply 
from the treatment afforded handbilling in interpreting the producer-distributor relationship 
entitled to protection under the publicity proviso of§ 8(b)(4). See Milk Drivers Local 537 
(Lohman Sales Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 901 (1961), cited with approval in NLRB v. Servette, Inc., 
377 U.S. 46, 55 (1964) ("The proviso was the outgrowth of a profound Senate concern that the 
union's freedom to appeal to the public for support of their case be adequately safe-
guarded. . . . It would fall far short of achieving this basic purpose if the proviso applied only 
in situations where the union's labor dispute is with the manufacturer or processor."). Com-
pare Local No. 662, Radio & Television Engrs., 133 N.L.R.B. 1698, 1705 (1961) (handbilling 
of advertisers on struck radio station permitted, on theory that "radio station, by adding its 
labor in form of capital, enterprise, and service to the automobiles which it advertises for the 
secondary retail distributor of the automobiles, becomes one of the producers of the 
automobiles" (emphasis added)), with Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 
F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (picketing of restaurant, an advertiser in struck newspaper, 
disallowed, since product of primary employer is "advertising"). 
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political speech. 149 In its recent decisions, the Court has shown a 
willingness to permit greater regulation of "non-political" than 
"political" speech where a substantial governmental interest is 
shown.150 The actual and substantial harm rule is narrowly drawn 
to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting neutral parties 
149. Compare Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 3ll, 316 (D.C. 
Cir. 1962), a.ffd on other grounds, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) ("[I]t may well be that the picketing in 
this case is closer to the core notion of constitutionally protected free speech than the picketing 
the Supreme Court has held may be banned."), with A. Cox, supra note 77, at 48 ("Requests 
for immediate assistance in putting economic pressure upon one with whom the speaker is 
engaged in driving a private business bargain are readily distinguishable from words looking 
forward to political action."). 
Professor Cox has suggested that Safeco "can be fitted into the body of first amendment 
law if picketing is classified with commercial advertising as economic speech." A. Cox, supra 
note 77, at 47. This approach, however, would not resolve the difficulties inherent in Safeco. 
That case is inconsistent with the Court's commercial speech cases, such as Central Hudson 
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See Note, Picketing and 
Commercial Speech, supra note 23, at 960 ("The Court's unwarranted deference to restrictions 
on labor picketing stands in stark contrast to its exacting first amendment scrutiny of restric• 
tions on commercial advertising."). Safeco is also inconsistent with nonlabor picketing cases 
like Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980). See 
notes 82-84supra and accompanying text. Moreover, Professor Cox's approach focuses on the 
subject rather than the mode of speech, labor disputes as opposed to labor picketing. Conse-
quently, other modes oflabor speech, such as handbilling, would also experience a diminution 
of constitutional status. Thus, the solution proposed by Professor Cox neither locates the "sub-
stantial government interest" essential at any level of first amendment analysis of regulation of 
speech, nor provides the rationale with which to differentiate picketing from other modes of 
expression. See also St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 904 ("It would be anomalous, at least, if the 
recent extension of some constitutional safeguards to commercial advertising should be accom-
panied by their contraction in the case of union picketing." (footnote omitted)). 
150. Compare NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 102 S. Ct. 3409, 3437 (1982) ("A mas-
sive and prolonged effort to change the social, political, and economic structure of a local 
environment cannot be characterized as a violent conspiracy simply by reference to the ephem• 
era! consequences of relatively few violent acts."), and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67 
( I 980) ("Public-issue picketing, 'an exercise of . . . basic constitutional rights in their most 
pristine and classic form,' Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963), has always 
rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of the First Amendment values."), with FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of an FCC reg-
ulation prohibiting broadcast of "profane" language) ("These words offend for the same rea-
sons that obscenity offends. Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values [is 
comparable to 'fighting words'.]" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1941))), and Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (upholding 
zoning ordinances conditioning location of "adult theatres") ("[F]ew of us would march our 
sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' 
exhibited in the theaters of our choice .... [T]he City must be allowed a reasonable opportu-
nity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."). See also Note, Picketing 
and Commercial Speech, supra note 23, at 947-49. 
It is perhaps relevant to the problem of labor picketing that the regulations in Young and 
Pac!fica were permitted not merely on the content of the speech, but on the content in the 
context of the manner of presentation (explicit language on daytime radio, sexually explicit 
materials purveyed through community storefronts). It does not excuse the Court's failure to 
fulfill its " 'task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing it against the 
public interest allegedly served by the regulation,' " Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil• 
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977) (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975)). But, 
perhaps it provides a starting point for analysis, when understood in conjunction with the 
principle that, "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself and that law must 
reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method." Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
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involved in labor disputes. 151 Evidence of the effect of picketing on 
secondary businesses suggests that the rule will be invoked infre-
quently.152 By narrowly applying section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in this man-
ner, the courts can overcome the statutory and constitutional 
complications inherent in Sefeco. The Sefeco decision, however, 
will remain irreconcilable with any theory of first amendment juris-
prudence as long as the Court ignores the realities of secondary con-
sumer picketing. 153 
CONCLUSION 
Restrictions on secondary consumer picketing are based on as-
sumptions that have never been subjected to serious scrutiny. De-
clines in union membership and bargaining power, changes in public 
attitudes toward labor picketing, and expansion of first amendment 
protections have been substantial since the passage of the LMRDA, 
but have gone unacknowledged in the Supreme Court's application 
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). As a result, the Court failed in Sefeco to 
develop a coherent basis for its decision, because neither logic nor 
precedent supports the fiat prohibition on dominant product secon-
dary picketing that the Court announced. 
An examination of secondary consumer picketing in light of con-
temporary realities demonstrates that the Court's decision in Sefeco 
is not an incidental limitation on speech in furtherance of a substan-
tial, clearly defined government interest. Rather, it is an overbroad 
curtailment of speech that advances a speculative purpose in contra-
vention of the policy balance struck by Congress. Even if the Court 
is firmly convinced of the constitutionality of congressional limita-
tions placed upon labor picketing for the protection of neutral par-
ties, it cannot excuse the Board and the courts from reviewing the 
facts of each case to ensure that the restriction is narrowly tailored to 
its purpose. Whatever the reasonableness of the "delicate balance" 
struck by Congress in devising section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) in 1959, the 
Court must recognize that both labor and the first amendment have 
since entered a new era. Failure to reconcile the two in a principled 
manner does measurable harm to each. 
151. See Note, Picketing and Publicity, supra note 41, at 1281. 
152. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text. 
Secondary consumer boycotts have had their greatest success in smaller one- or two-indus-
try union towns. See Cook, supra note 51, at 25; Testing Labor's 'Ultimate Weapon', Bus. 
WEEK, July 25, 1964, at 52, 54. The influence of the union in these communities, however, is 
so great that it minimizes the effect of a picketing injunction on the union's ability to publicize 
a dispute. 
153. See St. Antoine, supra note 8, at 903 ("Because the Supreme Court has the last word 
on the Constitution, its fiats prevail. Yet, without a principled foundation, they tend not to 
endure. . . . In all probability, we have not seen the end of this debate."). 
